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Deadly Business: The Making of the Modern Cartel 
 
Introduction 
On April 1, 2018, US President Donald Trump once again attacked Mexico for 
allowing drugs and people to flow freely through the country into the United States. He 
tweeted, “[Mexico] must stop the big drug and people flow, or I will stop their cash cow, 
NAFTA. NEED WALL!” His statement comes after claiming the United States would 
pull out of trade negotiations if Mexico did not do more to secure its northern border. 
Although the tweet has since been deleted and replaced with an attack on US democrats 
for inaction and weak policies, frontrunner for the upcoming Mexican presidential 
election, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, issued a statement of his own. At a campaign 
event in Ciudad Juárez, he stated, “We are going to be very respectful toward the United 
States government, but we are also going to demand that (the United States) respect 
Mexicans.” He went on to assert, “Neither Mexico nor its people will be the piñata of any 
foreign government.”1 This exchange illustrates the current political climate between the 
two countries. In the United States, the current administration uses hyperbolic rhetoric in 
an attempt to gain a position of power over the renegotiation of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). However, this type of bullying only serves to move talks 
further away from achieving a deal. Both countries need to recognize and take 
																																																								
1 AFP, “Mexico Presidential Front-runners Hit Back at Trump Tweets,” The Express 
Tribune (April 2, 2018). https://tribune.com.pk/story/1675018/3-mexico-presidential-front-
runners-hit-back-trump-tweets/. 	
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accountability for their actions in creating the current drug and humanitarian problems in 
Mexico. 
Both the United States and Mexico had a hand in nurturing the violent drug trade 
in Mexico. While some individuals attribute the rise of organized crime in Mexico to the 
fall of Colombian drug lords in the early-1990s and the democratic political opening in 
Mexico, culminating in the 2000 presidential election, these reasons attribute passive 
responsibility to the United States and Mexico. First, in the case of the collapse of 
Colombian cartels, Mexican criminal groups did gain more power because narcos now 
had the ability to take control of the flow of goods. The second argument only highlights 
institutional failings in Mexico. Because of the democratic opening in Mexico, the once 
tacit oversight government had over organized crime fractured, and the new government 
allowed organized crime to rise.2 However, neither of these arguments considers how and 
why cartels underwent a corporatization and militarization process.   
Understanding these two processes, and each government’s role, is critical for 
productive negotiation talks and reducing the level of violence in Mexico. 
Corporatization can be understood as the creation of subsidiaries through horizontal 
integration, diversification of business portfolio, and the control of land and 
infrastructure. Mexico’s neoliberal reforms during the 1980s and 1990s allowed 
organized crime “to diversify their activities and to operate more as modern transnational 
																																																								
2 Miguel Ángel Pérez Vite, “La violencia y vulnerabilidad en México: Una lectura 
crítica,” 
http://cei.colmex.mx/Estudios%20sobre%20violencia/Estudios%20Violencia%20México%20Mat
eriales%20recibidos/Miguel%20Vite,%20Vulnerabilidad.pdf.  
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corporations with less centralized government control.”3 For example, with the protection 
of political elites, such as Carlos Salinas, the Gulf Cartel experienced an exponential 
growth throughout the 1990s. This growth created the need for corporate security, which 
spawned Los Zetas, who started the process of militarization—the adoption of military 
tactics, strategies, and procedures. Los Zetas was the first group to undergo this process 
and codified the corporate-military model organized crime uses today.  
This paper seeks to provide a historical perspective on Mexico’s Drug War and 
how neoliberal policies and corruption produced the corporatization and militarization of 
organized crime. Without the neoliberal reforms and government corruption, organized 
crime would not have experienced such rapid growth. Therefore, with the current US 
administration calling for the renegotiation of NAFTA, understanding these two 
processes can help US and Mexican decision-makers work to decrease the power and 
influence of criminal groups and reduce the level of violence in Mexico. First, the paper 
provides a historiographical overview of drug history in Mexico, so anyone interested in 
understanding of the issues further can access the longer, more detailed history. Next, the 
paper breaks down into two chapters. Chapter One discusses how Mexican President 
Carlos Salinas’ administration implemented a neoliberal reform in Mexico, culminating 
in NAFTA. It then explains how the neoliberal reforms generated the corporatization of 
cartels and speculates on the administration’s connections to organized crime, 
particularly the Gulf Cartel. Chapter two then moves to explain how corporatization gave 
																																																								
3 Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, Los Zetas, Inc.: Criminal Corporations, Energy, and Civil  
War in Mexico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2017), 24. 
	 4	
rise to Los Zetas, who started the militarization of organized crime. Finally, the 
conclusion reflects on the impact of these two processes, which have resulted in 
unprecedented levels of violence, and it offers some points of negotiation that Mexico 
and the United States should consider rather than blaming one another. 
 
Historiography 
When researching contentious topics—such as human rights violations, violence, 
or government repression—tracking down and identifying potential evidence is critical, 
yet difficult. After locating a source base, the material then influences the methodological 
lens through which a project may take shape. Evidence presents an issue for any research 
project; however, for contentious topics, access to materials becomes all the more 
problematic. Mexico’s drug history is one topic in which access to sources is limited. 
Researchers must be creative with identifying potential collections and methodological 
approaches to produce strong, empirical scholarship. Although Mexico’s Drug War is a 
difficult topic to study, research is necessary to understand Mexico’s current political and 
security problems. Recently, scholars across several disciplines have begun filling this 
historiographical gap, but much more work still remains.  
 Historians Paul Gootenberg and Isaac Campos offer an excellent starting point for 
researchers interested in drug history. In “Toward a New Drug History of Latin America: 
A Research Frontier at the Center of Debates,” Gootenberg and Campos explore how 
drug history was previously conducted and offer a clear framework for a new drug 
history. According to the two authors, the old drug history fetishized drugs and organized 
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crime too much rather than producing research that provides context and draws 
connections to larger issues in Latin America. As such, the Hispanic American Historical 
Review article provides some historiographical and methodological approaches towards 
researching drug history and consists of three main objectives.  
First, Gootenberg and Campos explain that the periodization of drug history 
comprises of four distinct periods, and they then problematize differences between licit 
and illicit drugs, which requires them to start with a broad definition. The authors rely on 
anthropologist Sidney Mintz’s definition of drug foods that includes licit and illicit drugs, 
such as coffee, tobacco, cocaine, and marijuana. The four periods of drug history are pre-
Columbian, colonial, the long nineteenth century of national drugs (1800-1940), and the 
globalization of illicit drug circuits (1940-present).4  
The second objective is to provide suggestions on methodological approaches to 
drug history. Here, they connect the difficulties of conducting drug history to the 
difficulties of doing subaltern studies, and they explain why successful approaches to 
subaltern studies can aid in achieving quality drug history scholarship. Gootenberg and 
Campos explain that meaningful drug history can be approached through various 
subfields, such as social, cultural, policy, diplomatic, imperial, and legal history. 
Therefore, drug history lends itself to interdisciplinary studies.5 Finally, the third 
																																																								
4 Gootenberg, Paul, and Isaac Campos. “Toward a New Drug History of Latin America: 
A Research Frontier at the Center of Debates.” Hispanic American Historical Review 95, no. 1 
(Feb 2015): 2-3. 
5 Ibid., 17. 
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objective is to provide three example essays, which follows Gootenberg’s and Campos’ 
article, that illustrate this new approach.  
The new drug history requires researchers to stop fetishizing drug history and 
make connections to the larger problems facing Latin America. While Gootenberg and 
Campos did not invent the new drug history standard, their article is the first to clearly 
articulate what it is. The two historians use the historiography available to establish the 
periodization of drug history into four distinct eras and explain why an interdisciplinary 
approach best serves scholarly investigation. Gootenberg and Campos are pioneering the 
field of drug history and call on scholars to answer tough questions, such as how did 
corporatization and militarization of cartels take place, which this paper seeks to address.  
Luis Alejandro Astorga Almanza is a prominent drug historian from Mexico, who 
Gootenberg and Campos rightly acknowledge as partaking in this new drug history 
approach since the mid-1990s. Astorga Almanza’s seminal work is El Siglo de Las 
Drogas: El Narcotráfico, Del Porfiriato Al Nuevo Milenio. First published in 1996, El 
Siglo de Las Drogas is now in its third edition, which was published in 2016.6 This 
classic and concise piece of scholarship explores the history of prohibited drugs, their 
uses, and their relationship to various actors from the Porfiriato to the present. A key 
objective is to provide a better understanding about the relationship between crime and 
politics and how perceptions about certain drugs changed over time. To understand and 
show change over time, Astorga Almanza structures the book around various decades and 																																																								
6 Luis Alejandro Astorga Almanza, El Siglo de Las Drogas: El Narcotráfico, Del 
Porfiriato Al Nuevo Milenio (México, D.F.: Penguin Random House Grupo Editorial México, 
2016). 
	 7	
traces the relationship of drugs, such as opium and marijuana, with individuals and 
institutions. Because of the book’s long periodization, it provides a survey of Mexico’s 
long twentieth century drug history. Astorga Almanza’s work presents an introduction to 
Mexico’s drug history and offers an entry point for future scholars to investigate a 
specific topic or decade. 
 While Astorga Almanza traverses two periods that Gootenberg and Campos 
described in their article, Ricardo Pérez Montfort positions his work firmly in the period 
of the long nineteenth century. In Tolerancia y Prohibición: Aproximaciones a la 
Historia Social y Cultural de las Drogas en México, 1840-1940, Pérez Monfort explores 
how Mexican society and the government fostered and ultimately gave rise to drug 
prohibition in Mexico. Similar to Astorga Almanza, Pérez Montfort analyzes the 
relationship of drugs and their uses throughout Mexican society. However, by focusing 
on this earlier period, Pérez Montfort identifies several key cultural processes that 
resulted in creating Mexico’s current policies towards drugs. Through a socio-cultural 
framework, Pérez Montfort discusses Mexico’s restriction of both production and 
consumption of drugs. He constructs his argument using literature, cinema, newspapers, 
corridos, and government sources, which provide insights into how Mexican society 
functioned at the time. However, his spatial focus is limited to Mexico City. 
Although Pérez Montfort’s national context narrowly depicts society in Mexico 
City, his contextualization reflects social and cultural influence on state formation. Pérez 
Montfort illustrates how dangerous substances, such as alcohol, marijuana, and opium, 
became a public health concern in need of prohibiting to help establish control of the 
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population from the 1840s through the revolution. Consequently, government prohibition 
gave rise to an informal market for illicit goods, which organized criminal groups stepped 
in to fill.  
Pérez Montfort charts the transition of drugs from a public health issue to criminal 
prohibition, which came to a head in the revolutionary nation-building era. Towards the 
end of the violent period of the revolution, Mexico began outlawing drugs, such as opium 
and marijuana, and creating agencies to track the nascent illicit drug trade, such as Buró 
de Narcóticos del Departamento de Tesoro.7 Nonetheless, Pérez Montfort argues that 
even though the Mexican state prohibited certain drugs, cultural tolerance led to 
inefficient and corrupt practices regarding the restriction of narcotics, which fostered the 
rise of drug trafficking organizations. 
Pérez Montfort’s social and cultural approach produced an excellent piece of 
scholarship. His use of literature and cultural discourse allowed him to construct a history 
that highlights Mexico’s desire to control its population. However, his use of government 
sources shows Mexico’s lack of political will to accomplish its goal of drug prohibition, 
and his work illustrates the disconnect between legislation and implementation.  
 Regardless of the subject matter, Mexican historiography tends to produce a 
plethora of regional histories, and drug history is no different. Two of the top new drug 
history scholars today are Carlos Antonio Flores Pérez and Benjamin Smith. First, in 
Historias de Polvo y Sangre Génesis y Evolución del Tráfico de Drogas en el Estado de 																																																								
7 Ricardo Pérez Montfort, Tolerancia y Prohibición: Aproximaciones a la Historia 
Social y Cultural de las Drogas en México, 1840-1940 (Penguin Random House Grupo Editorial, 
México, 2016), 268. 
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Tamaulipas, 1947-1987, Flores Pérez examines how the state of Tamaulipas became one 
marred with violence and organized crime. He uses an institutional approach to illustrate 
how a long history of corruption and impunity nurtured the rise of some of Mexico’s 
most violent and profitable drug trafficking organizations, such as the Gulf Cartel and 
Los Zetas. Interestingly, while Flores Pérez’s work depicts a regional history, he never 
traveled to the region to conduct archival research; instead, he relied on government 
documents and hemerográfico (i.e., newspaper and journal) resources to construct his 
argument away from the violence. According to Flores Pérez, Tamaulipas’ violent drug 
problem stems from corrupt practices since the 1940s that over decades relinquished 
control of the state to organized crime.8 Sympathetic to the current need for better 
understanding of the historical processes that facilitated Tamaulipas’ existing problems, 
but not wanting to endanger himself, Flores Pérez took advantage of archives in Mexico 
City, contemporary historiography, and online sources to demonstrate how historic actors 
fostered instability in the region. He relied on Mexican security and judicial institutions 
to construct his argument, and he shows how these institutions understood the growing 
problem but ultimately failed at rectifying the situation in Tamaulipas. 
Second, similar to Flores Pérez, historian Benjamin Smith analyzes a specific 
region to better understand Mexico’s current Drug War. In “The Rise and Fall of 
Narcopopulism: Drugs, Politics, and Society in Sinaloa, 1930-1980,” Smith explores 
post-revolutionary state formation processes to identify the interplay between state 																																																								
8 Carlos Antonio Flores Pérez. Historias de Polvo y Sangre Génesis y Evolución del 
Tráfico de Drogas en el Estado de Tamaulipas, 1947-1987 (CIESAS, México, 2013). 
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politics, drug trafficking, and social processes. His research shows the relationship 
between the state of Sinaloa, organized crime, and the national government. He argues 
that the post-revolutionary government did not rely on centralized power but rather on 
decentralized, interlinking pacts among state, regional, and other local interests to 
develop projects regarding agrarismo, education, and indigenismo. However, according 
to Smith, these revolutionary pacts were not only with legitimate groups but also forged 
with illicit groups, such as the drug trade. Smith develops the term “narcopopulism” to 
discuss the relationship between local and national officials with organized crime. He 
explains that the drug trade contributed to the social stability in two key ways—
“appeasing both right-wing and radical groups.”9  
For the drug trade’s assistance in state-building processes, government authorities 
turned a blind eye to the illicit growing and trafficking of narcotics. From the 1930s to 
the 1970s, Smith explains, governors of Sinaloa controlled and regulated the drug 
industry, allowing larger networks to develop. In the late-1960s, these political pacts 
began to crumble because of the Cold War and political repression of radicals. By the 
1970s, state power fractured, leaving “the regulation of the drug trade disintegrated.”10 
As such, the entrepreneurial drug trade began regulating itself and corrupting individual 
political officials, who sought self-enrichment. Smith’s regional focus allows him to 
understand how the revolutionary state formation projects tolerated Mexico’s burgeoning 
																																																								
9 Benjamin T. Smith, “The Rise and Fall of Narcopopulism: Drugs, Politics, and Society 
in Sinaloa, 1930-1980,” Journal for the Study of Radicalism 7, no. 2 (Fall 2013), 127. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1353/jsr.2013.0015. 
10 Ibid., 144.  
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drug trade for national unity. Using a political approach, he connects his regional study to 
larger social processes, and the impact these tacit agreements played in constructing the 
current Drug War. In contextualizing his argument, Smith relies on a number of US and 
Mexican sources, such as newspapers and government reports.  
 Another way scholars contribute to the larger study of drug history is through the 
study of a single commodity. In Home Grown: Marijuana and the Origins of Mexico's 
War on Drugs, Campos examines marijuana’s long history in Mexico to understand the 
drug’s eventual prohibition. Traversing virtually all four of the periods, Campos traces 
the drug’s colonial adoption and usage through to the twentieth century, and he argues 
that marijuana’s prohibition was not influenced from the outside but rather home 
grown.11 He explains how marijuana came to Mexico through the Columbian Exchange 
and that the Spanish Crown first adopted the drug for its hemp and flax properties in the 
1540s. However, after independence, elites became concerned with the drug’s potential 
harm to Mexican culture.  
Campos constructs his argument in a concise manner, and he highlights the fact 
that Mexico’s decision to enter a prohibition era stems from issues concerning race, class, 
and cultural erosion. In making his argument, Campos makes the methodological choice 
to show changes in conception of marijuana between the colonial and independence 
periods. While it is possible that Campos could have made the same argument over a 
much shorter period, his argument becomes much more nuanced by including Mexico’s 
																																																								
11 Isaac Campos, Home Grown: Marijuana and the Origins of Mexico's War on Drugs 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 5. 
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colonial legacy. Moreover, he is only able to conduct this study because of his focus on a 
single drug rather than a strict discussion of the prohibition era. 
 By focusing on marijuana, Campos has access to a variety of different sources. 
His evidence comes from centuries of materials collected from the colonial and modern 
era, which are housed in a multitude of archives in Mexico City. This source base allows 
Campos to examine marijuana through various historical lenses, such as social, cultural, 
political and commercial. His interdisciplinary approach gives him the ability to show 
Mexico’s changing perceptions of the drug for political, cultural, and economic reasons. 
For example, while the Spanish saw the economic benefits of marijuana because of its 
versatility, independent Mexican elites began associating its consumption with criminals 
and the lower class.  
Another great addition to drug history comes from one of Paul Gootenberg’s 
former students. Froylán Enciso Higuera completed his dissertation in 2015, and he 
models his research on Gootenberg’s study of cocaine in Andean Cocaine. In “The Origin 
of Contemporary Drug Contraband: A Global Interpretation from Sinaloa,” Enciso 
Higuera examines how and why Sinaloa became a global leader in the illicit drug 
industry. While the dissertation claims to be a global history, the author makes sure to tell 
the story from a very local, Mexican perspective—thus, using Gootenberg’s method of a 
“glocal” historical analysis. The method is simply having the awareness and 
understanding that there is no such thing as a true global history but rather a history of a 
particular region or nation that interacts and affects things beyond its borders. Moreover, 
to present his work in an unbiased fashion, he employs a speculative 
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heterophenomenological theoretical perspective, which moves from the frontiers outward 
to the global system.12 This theory seems more academic than a useful theoretical 
framework because it simply means the author takes a scientific approach and privileges 
his archival materials above all. Therefore, Enciso Higuera conducted extensive archival 
research, and he made the decision to focus his project on local and national Mexican 
archives while still making use of digital non-Mexican databases. According to Enciso 
Higuera, the primary sources used came from statements of drug producers, traffickers, 
and users found in court records he uncovered in Casa de la Cultura Jurídica de la 
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación in Mazatlan, Sinaloa.13 His originality comes 
from the unexplored nature of some of his archives. Because of these types of sources, 
Enciso Higuera’s work shows how scholars can safely bring out some of the voices inside 
the illicit drug trade. 
Another dissertation displays a transnational approach. Political scientist Carlos 
Pérez Ricart’s work provides a solid historical analysis. In “Las Agencias Antinarcóticos 
Y La Construcción Transnacional de La Guerra Contra Las Drogas En México (1938-
1978),” Pérez Ricart examines the relationship between US and Mexican anti-drug 
agencies in creating anti-narcotic policies in Mexico from 1938 to 1978. Pérez Ricart 
asks how US agencies impacted anti-narcotic policies in Mexico and how Mexico’s 																																																								
12 Enciso Higuera, Froylán Vladimir. “The Origin of Contemporary Drug Contraband: A  
Global Interpretation from Sinaloa.” Dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 
2015, 9. 
http://ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1763067714?accounti
d=711. 
13 Ibid., 11.  
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northern neighbor influenced state policies. Because of the specific nature of the 
questions, Pérez Ricart uses a transnational approach to explore the fluidity of movement 
and ideas between the two nations. Ultimately, he argues that Mexico initiated US anti-
drug policies during this thirty-year period. In constructing his argument, Pérez Ricart 
brings in numerous archival materials from US and Mexican archives. Moreover, one 
interesting source base Pérez Ricart uses is the Procuraduría General de la República 
(PGR). Pérez Ricart argues that a transnational historical approach is most fruitful in 
shedding light on potential contemporary policy recommendations because he views 
Mexico’s Drug War as inherently tied to US-Mexico relations.14 
Two recent books explore the impact one criminal group has had on Mexico: Los 
Zetas. First, political scientist George W. Grayson and investigative journalist Samuel 
Logan investigate the organization’s founding, its implementation of violent tactics, and 
the idea of dual sovereignty within certain Mexico regions in The Executioner’s Men:	Los 
Zetas, Rogue Soldiers, Criminal Entrepreneurs, and the Shadow State They Created. 
Grayson and Logan do a remarkable job at explaining the consequences of Los Zetas, 
both nationally and internationally. While their argument about dual sovereignty is 
understandable, it takes away agency from the Mexican state. Los Zetas, as with other 
criminal groups, do not want to subvert state control but rather seek to take advantage of 
infrastructure and operate within the state. Here, organized crime’s operations differ from 
Smith’s narcopopulism because government no longer regulates the drug industry; 																																																								
14 Carlos Pérez Ricart, “Las Agencias Antinarcóticos Y La Construcción Transnacional 
de La Guerra Contra Las Drogas En México (1938-1978).” Ph.D Dissertation, Freie Universität 
Berlin, 2016. 
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instead, criminal groups corrupt government officials as needed while allowing the state 
to function. Moreover, although the authors argue for the “zetanization” of Mexico, they 
do not explain how Los Zetas altered rival groups and the government, and forced both to 
adapt to this new model, resulting in unprecedented levels of violence. By subscribing to 
Los Zetas’ model, Mexico has become increasingly violent since the late-1990s.15   
More recently, in 2017, political scientist Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera produced a 
deep dive into the corporate model of the criminal group in Los Zetas, Inc.: Criminal 
Corporations, Energy, and Civil War in Mexico. Correa-Cabrera spent seven years 
researching and conducting oral interviews in the United States, Mexico, and Zeta 
territories to construct her study. Through an economic perspective, the book explores 
how criminal groups morphed into transnational organizations, specifically focusing on 
Los Zetas. She identifies how the criminal organization functions similar to large 
corporations, such as Exxon, and use a subsidiary structure. By using this structure, 
organized crime, as with legitimate businesses, can insulate the partner company if one 
cell gets in trouble with the law. Moreover, the various subsidiaries control different 
aspects of the business, such as extortion, drug trade, harvesting hydrocarbons, etc. 
Correa-Cabrera also explains how this violent corporate model sparked a heavy military 
response from the government, essentially creating a modern civil war. Yet, she does 
question whether or not the violence in Mexico between organized crime and the 
government constitutes being called a civil war.  																																																								
15 George W. Grayson and Samuel Logan, The Executioner’s Men: Los Zetas, Rogue 
Soldiers, Criminal Entrepreneurs, and the Shadow State They Created, (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 2012). 
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Los Zetas, Inc. provides a great piece of scholarly literature for policy-makers to 
understand the current problems in Mexico. However, it focuses on the business model 
rather than how US and Mexican policies fostered the violent, corporate-military model 
she investigates. Correa-Cabrera’s study provides much more detail about the 
corporatization and militarization of organized crime than this paper provides, and it is a 
must-read for anyone seeking a much deeper understanding of Mexico’s current situation. 
This report only seeks to offer a brief understanding of these two key processes and 
highlight the unintended consequences of government policies and offer suggestions to 
reduce violence in Mexico in light of the renegotiation of NAFTA. If the current 
negotiations refuse to consider how policies impact organized crime, criminal groups will 
only continue to grow in size and strength. 
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Chapter One: Corporatization of Organized Crime 
Most people today acknowledge the systemic corruption that exists in Mexico and 
the government’s links to organized crime. However, during the 1980s and early 1990s, 
many US officials believed Mexico was undergoing a modernizing process and 
combating corruption. The United States thought Mexican President Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari was spearheading Mexico’s change through neoliberal policies, which privatized 
many sectors of the economy, culminating in the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) between the United States and Canada. The United States also promoted 
Salinas as a champion against drug trafficking organizations and government corruption. 
Yet, Mexico has since seen an exponential increase in narcotic activity. If Salinas was 
fighting corruption and organized crime, why did cartels experience such tremendous 
growth during his administration? Cartels came to plague Mexico because the Salinas 
administration bolstered strong relationships with narcos, particularly the Gulf Cartel, and 
its neoliberal policies facilitated the corporatization of criminal groups.  
Carlos Salinas de Gortari emerged onto the Mexican political scene during 
Miguel de la Madrid’s presidency. After earning a Ph.D. in Political Science from 
Harvard, Salinas joined de la Madrid’s cabinet in 1982 as the Secretary of Planning and 
Budget. He was considered part of a new generation of politicians who believed in free 
trade and capitalism. During his tenure in the de la Madrid administration, Salinas first 
began his neoliberal onslaught on the inherited legacy from the Mexican Revolution.16 In 
																																																								
16 Carmen Boullosa and Mike Wallace, A Narco History: How the United States and 
Mexico Jointly Created the “Mexican Drug War” (New York: OR Books, 2015), 47. 
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1987, by working diligently for the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), de la 
Madrid named Salinas as his chosen successor for president; however, this endorsement 
did not mean Salinas would go unchallenged. 
As part of the Democratic Front within the PRI, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the son of 
revolutionary reformist Lázaro Cárdenas, was outraged over the PRI’s lack of democracy 
and neoliberal policies. He ran against Salinas in the 1988 Presidential election.17 More 
importantly, Cárdenas presented the first real threat to the decades-long single party rule 
of the PRI. Cárdenas was decisively ahead in the polls on the day of the election; 
unfortunately, voting computers suddenly crashed abruptly halting the election. A month 
later officials publicly declared Salinas the winner.18 Many considered the results to be 
blatant electoral fraud, which caused people to become furious. An estimated 250,000 
citizens converged on Zócalo Plaza in Mexico City, many holding effigies of Salinas, 
shouting: “You’re a liar, baldy, you lost the election! We’ll pull him out by the ears! Viva 
el Presidente Cárdenas!”19 Clearly, Salinas entered the presidency under a cloud of 
suspicion. This public distrust, however, did not deter Salinas from implementing his 
counter-revolutionary policies. 
 
Salinas the Drug Czar 
																																																								
17 Ibid., 47. 
18 Ioan Grillo, El Narco: Inside Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency (New York: Bloomsbury 
Press, 2011), 76-77. 
19 Boullosa and Wallace, A Narco History, 49. 
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Richard Nixon declared “war on drugs” in a 1971 speech, and the United States 
has since strong-armed other countries to assist them in their anti-narcotic efforts. To 
achieve his political reforms, Salinas understood this fact and gave the illusion of 
combating drug trafficking. One particular foreign policy that influenced Salinas’ actions 
was the 1986 US Omnibus Anti-Drug Bill. The bill was the result of three US 
Congressional reports issued by the Tower Commission, Walsh Commission, and Kerry 
Commission. These reports concluded various drug lords in Latin America aided the 
Contra movement in Nicaragua in return for the United States assisting them in 
trafficking narcotics.20 From these commissions’ conclusions, the United States passed 
the Omnibus Anti-Drug Bill, which created a certification process. The purpose of this 
process was to ensure that all major drug smuggling nations cooperated with the United 
States’ drug war. If US officials determined any country was not fully cooperating, it 
would decertify the nation, meaning barring any decertified state from receiving US aid, 
International Monetary Fund loans, and more.21 These benefits are vital to any, if not all, 
narco-trafficking nations and could have devastating ramifications on the country’s 
economy, so Salinas made certain that Mexico appeared as fully cooperating with US 
drug enforcement agencies. 
Salinas was ambitious and could not afford to lose US support if he hoped to 
accomplish his neoliberal goals. In 1988, at his inaugural address, Salinas declared, 
“Drug trafficking has become a grave threat to the security of Mexico and to the health of 																																																								
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Mexicans.”22 This pronouncement led the United States to believe that the Salinas 
administration would be the ally it needed in the war on drugs. Unfortunately, Salinas’ 
familial connection to the Gulf Cartel was unknown at the time, so Mexico was able to 
foster the image of bilateral cooperation. The Salinas administration promoted a number 
of anti-narcotics policies, such as the creation of the National Institute for the Fight 
Against Drug Trafficking, increasing Custom inspectors’ salaries, bilateral intelligence 
operations, and many more. Because of Salinas’ efforts to wage war on drugs, the US 
Department of State, in 1993, proclaimed, “Mexico’s anti-drug effort is among the most 
dynamic and comprehensive in the hemisphere.”23 However, scandal after scandal 
involving government corruption came to light, yet the United States continued to certify 
Mexico. This lack of accountability allowed Salinas to push for a North American Free 
Trade Agreement with the United States virtually unimpeded by the government’s 
connections to organized crime. 
Salinas’ public anti-narcotic stance, however, did not fool everyone. Phillip 
Jordan, retired (1996) Drug Enforcement Agent and former Director of the El Paso 
Intelligence Center, testified before the US Congressional House Committee on 
Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources that “every year since certification was approved, Mexico will do a show-and-
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tell-type thing… right before February-March.”24 Here, Jordan points out how Mexican 
authorities would conduct a large seizure or make a big arrest to secure US certification. 
He went on to argue that Mexico “so contorted the process that they have convinced 
some people that there should be an international certification…, which is one of the 
most unbelievable distortions of denying U.S. sovereignty and who gets these trade 
benefits or financial assistance.”25 Shockingly, throughout the tenure of the certification 
process, which ended in the mid-2000s, Mexico was never decertified. 
Besides Salinas’ masquerade as an anti-narcotic soldier, US economic interests 
have more to do with Mexico receiving certification each year. The United States played 
softball with Mexico compared to other countries. For example, despite knowing about 
countless corrupt officials and charges of impunity towards organized crime, Mexico 
continued to receive certification; whereas, in Colombia, where US economic interests 
are lower, the United States decertified the country on discovering that drug money 
contaminated the election of President Samper in the late 1990s.26 The justification for 
continued US certification, however, was not made public until February 29, 2000.  
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Congressman John Mica reported to the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 
and Human Resources, “While decertification would suspend assistance to Mexico, the 
greatest impact would be on EXIM Bank financing. Mexico is the single largest 
beneficiary of EXIM programs, bringing hundreds of millions of dollars in business to 
U.S. exporters and service providers.”27 Undoubtedly aware of the potential ramifications 
to the United States if Mexico were ever decertified, Salinas maintained a strong public 
appearance as an anti-narcotic proponent in order to foster support for his neoliberal 
agenda, which allowed organized crime to adopt a corporate model and take advantage of 
the recent privatization and newly developed infrastructure. 
 
Neoliberal Policies and Consequences 
During Salinas’ sexenio (1988-1994)—six-year presidential term—he vigorously 
sought privatization. Salinas proclaimed his reasoning in his 1989 State of the Nation 
address explaining, “Most of the reforms of our revolution have run their course and no 
longer guarantee the new development Mexico demands.”28 Here, in order for Mexico to 
modernize and become a global leader, Salinas thought the country needed to embrace 
neoliberal and capitalist reforms, which he first started during the de la Madrid 
administration. He was able to report in 1991 that he had reduced the number of federally 
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owned companies by 266.29 Additionally, in 1992, Salinas modified Article 27 of the 
constitution to allow the privatization of ejidos—communal lands. It is believed that the 
expropriation of ejido lands for private investment has led to around 400,000 square 
kilometers being controlled by organized crime.30 Because of Salinas, the US 
Congressional Research Service asserts, “Mexico has reduced the size of its government 
through privatization and macroeconomic reforms, and it has opened the economy to 
trade and investment.”31 Salinas’ policies created an enormous amount of wealth for the 
elite class in the country as well. For example, one way some generated wealth was 
through the privatization of highway construction. The government allowed private 
citizens the ability to build four-lane highways and charge tolls, and these new roads 
connect rural lands to the border allowing for more efficient transporting of goods: licit 
and illicit alike.32 When Forbes came out with their billionaires list in 1987, Mexico only 
had one individual on it, but the country increased that number to twenty-four billionaires 
by 1994.33  
Salinas also succeeded in creating greater inequality. Through the opening of 
Mexico’s markets and privatization, the relative purchasing power of minimum wages 
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was reduced, which contributed to an influx of laborers into the drug trade.34 Salinas at 
least had the foresight to understand the potential impact on the lower classes, so, as a 
way to garner public support, he established the National Solidarity Program 
(PRONASOL) in 1989. PRONASOL attempted to appease the masses with a set of 
“neopopulist solutions”—a cultural program that fosters national unity—to curb the 
problems created from his neoliberal reforms.35 He then doubled down on the program in 
1991 elevating it to a cabinet level position with the creation of the Ministry for Social 
Development (SEDESOL). With public opinion high, the program achieved its goals of 
securing PRI votes in the 1991, mid-term election.36 Yet, it was Salinas’ ability to 
establish the North American Free Trade Agreement that secured his place as a neoliberal 
reformer. 
The development of a free trade agreement, besides many other factors, possesses 
an interesting history of exchange between President Salinas and US President George H. 
W. Bush. With his perfect English, Carlos Salinas began immediately wooing President 
Bush once he entered office. On October 3, 1989, at their first meeting, President Salinas 
got straight to business explaining, “The first subject I would like to mention is trade. We 
took positive steps to open trade before we got any benefits. Now we are asking for 
reciprocity.”37 President Bush agreed with Salinas, but he had concerns about drug 																																																								
34 Russell, Mexico Under Salinas, 277. 
35 José Luis Velasco, Insurgency, Authoritarianism, and Drug Trafficking in Mexico’s 
“Democratization” (New York: Routledge Press, 2005), 71. 
36 Ibid. 
37 United States, White House. Meeting with Mexican President Carlos Salinas De 
Gortari (1989), 2-3. 
	 25	
activity. Salinas quickly stated, “I would like to mention that we are fighting drugs 
because they are a threat to our national security. Drug trafficking is a scourge….”38 
Understanding the need to combat the drug trade as it pertains to a NAFTA deal, the two 
presidents continued to push their countries’ respective agendas over the next few years. 
Salinas and Bush worked to resolve the trade matter, but they faced some 
opposition.  In 1990, they addressed several potential issues that the opposition raised. 
One of the more outlandish issues was their discussion of being environmentally 
conscious. On that subject, President Salinas somewhat exasperated explained, “One area 
where we have made real progress is on the environment and Mexico’s sea turtles… As 
President Bush knows, we protect not only the sea turtles, but land turtles.” To which 
President Bush jokingly replied, “It is good for both countries to improve the conditions 
for turtles to make love!”39 This playful back-and-forth suggests that although Salinas 
and Bush were confident a deal would be accomplished, they did not know how long it 
would take.  
By 1991, President Bush, somewhat frustrated, explained in front of his staff, 
President Salinas, and several of his advisors that his administration was committed to a 
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free trade agreement. “I wanted each of you to hear from me that no matter how hot the 
political pressures become,” Bush asserts, “we will not move an inch back…. We are 
pregnant. We are not going to get unpregnant.”40 President Salinas was excited by 
President Bush’s statement, and he was happy to inform him that Mexico was “fully 
committed… [and] Two-thirds are for it and it is not that the others are all against it.”41 
This exchange was not only for the benefit of the two presidents but also their staff, and 
they wished to encourage them to seek out those who opposed the agreement and secure 
their votes.  
Although Bush would leave office before any agreement came to fruition, 
Salinas’ goal of achieving a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) did occur. 
During the presidency of Bill Clinton, Salinas obtained a monumental achievement in 
foreign policy. NAFTA took effect on January 1, 1994; however, the implementation of 
such an agreement, along with his other neoliberal policies, allowed for the 
corporatization of narco-businesses.42 The access to land and infrastructure the neoliberal 
atmosphere generated allowed the Gulf Cartel to form its transnational company.43 
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Salinas’ neoliberal policies facilitated the corporatization of narco-traffickers in 
several ways. Ironically, “one of the reasons to encourage Members to vote for NAFTA,” 
a US Congressional report claimed, “was [it] would have a positive impact on drug 
trafficking between the United States and Mexico.”44 The irony is that neoliberal policies 
did have a positive impact on cartels; unfortunately, for Mexico and the United States, it 
positively benefited illicit trafficking as an industry rather than curbing it. The policies 
allowed narcos to undergo a corporatization process and grow their businesses at an 
alarming rate. For example, the privatization of land allowed “drug traffickers using their 
dirty money to buy vast amounts of land and businesses as far as 50 to 60 miles on each 
side of the border itself, creating what is, in effect, almost a trade free zone for drug 
trafficking, a free trade zone that they alone control,” according to a US Congressional 
report.45 Moreover, through the acquisition of territory, cartels gained access to 
maquiladora infrastructure—manufacturing warehouses along the border. These facilities 
received minimal inspections, providing smugglers staging areas to package and ship 
illicit goods.46 This real-estate boom and corporatization process increased competition 
between cartels vying for the best trafficking routes. Since the Gulf Cartel controlled 
some of the most lucrative ports on the Texas-Mexico border, the organization developed 
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its own corporate security, Los Zetas, who started the militarization of narcos. 
Consequently, Mexico has witnessed a severe increase in violence since NAFTA’s 
implementation. 
Another aspect of Salinas’ neoliberal reforms aiding the growth of the drug 
industry deals with agriculture and labor. While it takes time to understand the impact of 
policies, NAFTA eventually opened Mexico up to large US agri-businesses. Many small 
Mexican farming operations were forced into growing illicit crops in order to survive, or 
these farmers left rural areas altogether and moved to border towns seeking more 
lucrative opportunities, which often meant entering the drug industry.47 Therefore, narco-
trafficking CEOs took advantage of an increasing labor pool along with expanding their 
production operations. Additionally, the vibrant highway infrastructure established 
through neoliberal policies helped cartels ship their products from rural Mexican farms to 
US markets.48 Illicit crops were now easily transported to the border, packaged, and 
distributed throughout the United States in the same manner as many legal products. 
Since the implications of Salinas’ reforms were not entirely understood at the 
time, it was only after he left office did the extent of narco-corporatization begin to 
emerge. Before the US Congressional House Committee on Government Reform 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, retired Drug Enforcement Agent and former Director 
of the El Paso Intelligence Center, Phillip Jordan testified in 2000, “The drug black 
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market is no longer a marginal part of Mexico, but has become the very foundation which 
supports the Mexican Government.”49 Jordan’s testimony came only six years after the 
implementation of NAFTA, and he expresses clear concern for the speed with which drug 
traffickers grew in power and influence. Ultimately, Salinas’ administration is 
remembered for neoliberal policies that increased inequality and facilitated the 
corporatization of organized crime. 
  
Close to Corruption: Officials and Family 
Salinas’ administration was marred with corruption. Several high level officials 
close to Salinas possessed strong connections to drug trafficking organizations. In 
Mexico, “The idea is commonly held that benefiting from one’s position in private 
industry or government is part of the ‘Fringe Benefits’ that come with the position… 
Only the most blatant cases attract the attention of the media and the general public,” one 
US Embassy report claimed.50 Many consider corruption an active component of 
Mexican politics that one must navigate. Some individuals even knew that Raúl Salinas 
Lozano, President Salinas’ father, was linked to Gulf Cartel leader Juan García Ábrego.51 
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By the time Salinas became president, a partnership between organized crime and key 
officials was already in place, yet Salinas made the decision to build his administration 
with them. The most notable of these corrupt individuals were Guillermo González 
Calderoni and the president’s own brother, Raúl Salinas de Gortari. 
 First, Guillermo González Calderoni, a former commander of the Mexican 
Judicial Federal Police Anti-Drug Division, was a powerful individual who almost openly 
developed close relationships between government and narcos. Highly decorated US 
Drug Enforcement Agents, Hector Berrellez and Phillip Jordan, spoke favorably of 
González Calderoni for his contributions as a Mexican drug enforcement officer despite 
his known corruption. Besides his notable arrest of drug kingpin Miguel Félix Gallardo, 
Jordan explains, “Every agent that worked with [González Calderoni], regardless of his 
corruption, knew that he single-handedly opened a lot of doors for us to get to the 
murderers and torturers of [DEA agent] Kiki Camarena. He was a colleague, the s.o.b.”52 
Berrellez and Jordan’s singular focus on how González Calderoni helped them should not 
mitigate the horrific and corrupt deeds he committed. González Calderoni left his mark 
on the criminal underworld when he took five million dollars from Amado Carrillo 
Fuentes for murdering his rival, Pablo Acosta, for territory in 1987. Nor should their 
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belief in him negate the fact that the brother of his childhood friend, Juan García Ábrego, 
became the leader of the Gulf Cartel and closely associated to the Salinas family.53 
Eventually, playing a dangerous game with corrupt officials and narcos caught up 
with González Calderoni. He resigned his position in 1992, and then later fled to the 
United States for fear of being assassinated. At which point, González Calderoni became 
an informant for US drug agencies.54 The Mexican government attempted to extradite 
González Calderoni on charges of “torture, abuse of authority, smuggling, and illicit 
enrichment,” according to a US Consulate report, but it never produced sufficient 
evidence to force the US Department of Justice to comply.55 Ultimately, however, 
González Calderoni, after nearly a decade of accusations against the Salinas 
administration, was gunned down outside his lawyer’s office in McAllen, Texas in 2003. 
González Calderoni was just one of many Salinas officials who were linked to drug 
trafficking, so some people still argue Salinas did not know anything about criminal 
activities. The corruption case of Salinas’ brother, however, makes it harder to deny his 
involvement.  
 Raúl Salinas remains a controversial figure in Mexican politics. Throughout his 
brother’s presidency, his connection with drug trafficking was unclear. Many individuals 
knew of a certain level of corruption within the administration because of President 
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Salinas’ firing and arresting of several thousand employees, which gave the perception of 
him combating corruption, but the evidence implicating his brother never surfaced while 
in office. As such, Raúl Salinas appeared as just another member of the ruling class who 
received a government salary of $192,000 per year.56 It was later discovered that Raúl 
Salinas accumulated much more wealth than his salary permitted. “Mr. Salinas was able 
to transfer $90 million to $100 million between 1992 and 1994,” according to the US 
General Accounting Office, “by using a private banking relationship formed by Citibank 
New York in 1992.”57 This revelation implicating Raúl Salinas with involvement in the 
drug industry and money laundering was only revealed after his brother left office 
On February 28, 1995, Raúl Salinas was arrested in connection to the murder of 
his former brother-in-law and secretary general of the PRI, Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu, 
and for illicit enrichment from money laundering because of his narco-business.58 
Furthermore, Citibank, the financial institution the president’s brother used, put an alert 
on Raúl Salinas’ accounts, which led to the November 1995 arrest of his wife, Patricia 
Paulina Rios Castañón de Salinas, in Switzerland for attempting to withdrawal the funds. 
The US General Accounting Office conducted an investigation with the help of Citibank 
and issued a report detailing Raúl Salinas’ money laundering structure. The report finds, 																																																								
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“Citibank made no attempt to investigate Mr. Salinas’s background…. Further, 
[Citibank] believed that the majority of Mr. Salinas’s wealth had resulted from the sale of 
a construction company yet knew no specifics about the sale.”59 The financial institution 
did not do the proper due diligence before accepting Raúl Salinas as a client, which was 
yet another example of fringe benefits for being a member of the ruling class. In fact, 
Citibank allowed Salinas to establish a network of private banking accounts and various 
shell companies.60 The financial institution established one principal shell company, 
Trocca, “primarily for secrecy, tax advantages, and facilitating the distribution of 
assets…. To further insulate Mr. Salinas’s connection to Trocca, Cititrust (Cayman) used 
three additional shell companies to function as Trocca’s board of directors,” the US 
accounting report concluded.61 From the preponderance of evidence leveled against Raúl 
Salinas, he was convicted in 1999 of masterminding murder and money laundering and 
sentenced to prison for 50 years.  
Raúl Salinas’ conviction was believed to be a great first step towards ending 
impunity in Mexico; unfortunately, the victory was short-lived. In 2005, Raúl Salinas was 
released from Almoloya prison acquitted of the murder charges, but the courts initially 
left open the possibility of charging him for illicit enrichment. However, the future threat 
of more charges only delayed the inevitable when a family possesses as much power as 																																																								
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the Salinas family; Mexican authorities dropped the threat of all future charges against 
Raúl Salinas in 2013.62 Throughout the entire scandalous episode, the Salinas family 
denied every accusation, and they used their power and influence to secure Raúl’s 
freedom even though the family’s connection to the Gulf Cartel is now well known. 
Through the guise of modernizing Mexico and fighting corruption, the Salinas 
administration bolstered connections with organized crime, allowing these criminal 
groups to undergo a corporatization process. Due to Salinas’ neoliberal policies, 
particularly NAFTA, and government impunity, drug trafficking organizations have 
established relative narco-states in various parts of Mexico. However, concrete evidence 
implicating Carlos Salinas to the multitude of corruption scandals has yet to emerge. 
Some documents remain closed to the public while those released still have large sections 
blacked out. One US embassy report alludes to Carlos Salinas having direct involvement 
with narco-business, but the entire page remains classified.63 Eventually, the story will 
emerge, and scholars will no longer have to depend on tangential linkages between other 
corrupt officials, drug traffickers, and Carlos Salinas himself. Until more documents 
become declassified, Carlos Salinas’ involvement remains a mystery. Nonetheless, the 
neoliberal policies facilitated the corporatization of cartels, which sparred the rise of Los 
Zetas and the militarization of criminal groups. 
 
 																																																								
62 “Raúl Salinas libra 17 años de procesos penales (cronología).” 
63 In “United States Embassy: New Allegations Against Raúl Salinas 1999,” Page 7 
alludes to Carlos Salinas having direct interactions with narco-corruption, but the information on 
page 8 remains classified, which leaves only speculation to the extent of his actual involvement. 
	 35	
Chapter 2: The Rise of Los Zetas 
 
On August 24, 2010, bleeding from a gunshot, an Ecuadorian migrant made his 
way to a checkpoint in San Fernando, Tamaulipas seeking medical assistance. The 
terrified survivor told authorities he had escaped a nearby ranch, where he was held with 
dozens of others who were kidnapped after crossing Mexico’s southern border. After a 
deadly battle with an unknown number of gunmen, authorities discovered the horrific 
scene of 72 migrants—58 men and 14 women—from Central and South America 
massacred in a room with the bodies piled on top of each other.64 According to the 
survivor, the assailants killed the migrants because they refused to pay any ransom or 
work as assassins.65 This type of extortion has been crafted for nearly two decades by the 
perpetrators of this massacre—Los Zetas—one of Mexico’s deadliest drug cartels. 
Since the corporatization of cartels during the Salinas administration, the battle 
for territory and resources has increased between the various criminal groups. This power 
struggle gave birth to a more violent and militarized group. At the forefront of this brutal 
violence was Los Zetas: a paramilitary organization originally recruited to work 
corporate security and protection for the Gulf Cartel. The new group caused Mexico’s 
border states to be inundated with violence.66 Journalist Ioan Grillo argues that Los Zetas 
																																																								
64 Giving the victims a voice, a group of activists gathered information and created 
72migrantes.com, which was compiled into a book: Guillermoprieto, Alma ed. 72 Migrantes. 
Oaxaca de Juárez, Oaxaca: Almadía, 2011. 
65 Tuckman, Jo. “Survivor tells of escape from Mexican massacre in which 72 were left 
dead.” The Guardian. 25 August 2010. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/aug/25/mexico-
massacre-central-american-migrants. 
66 George W. Grayson, Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?, (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2010), 107. 
	 36	
are a “psychopathic criminal army that has broken all the rules in Mexico.”67 By breaking 
all the rules, Los Zetas created a new corporate-military model for cartel operations. Los 
Zetas adapted the corporate model to include military tactics and strategies, which forced 
rivals and the government to adapt as well, resulting in a drastic increase in the level of 
violence in Mexico. 
 The reasons for violence are well studied. Sociologist Randall Collins has spent 
his career researching violence and its existence. One of his prominent books, Violence: 
A Micro-Sociological Theory, argues that violence is not an easy thing to commit. 
Furthermore, if and when violence is committed, it is not typically done with any degree 
of competency. Collins explains that violence is caused by circumstance, such as narco-
trafficking. He states, for example, “Drug business violence occurs because the activities 
of an illegal business are not regulated by law.”68 Violence for narcos is a method of 
governing and regulating the industry and competing against one’s business adversaries. 
However, he acknowledges the existence of a select few who have the capacity for 
violence, and, according to Collins, “the violent few are those who use this emotional 
field to their advantage.”69 It is within this latter category of violence that Los Zetas fall 
under, and their uniquely brutal competency is the key cause for Mexico’s rising levels of 
violence. Even after their decline since 2012, the corporate-military model Los Zetas 
created is still very much alive and well.  																																																								
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 Los Zetas early on attained an unparalleled success in the drug trade by 
“establishing themselves as the most violent, destructive, and lethal participant in that 
industry.”70 Los Zetas employed fear and intimidation to achieve their means, but, unlike 
other cartels, they did not hesitate to torture or slaughter anyone who stood in their way.71 
This eagerness to engage in violence caused the Mexican Defense Ministry, in 2003, to 
classify the group “as the most formidable death squad to have worked for organized 
crime in Mexican history.”72 However, Los Zetas were not satisfied simply being a death 
squad, and it would eventually rise to become a formidable cartel in its own right.73 In 
states such as Tamaulipas, Los Zetas became a primary source of employment.74 With the 
increased brutality and the massive scale in which Los Zetas operated, rivals faced an 
intimidating adversary. 
 Although Los Zetas are not the first paramilitary group, they are innovators when 
it comes to the military tactics being deployed by organized crime today.75 They elevated 
the standard for cartel operations; rivals were forced to match the level of brutality and 
violence or submit to Los Zetas.76 This overt challenge to traditional cartels forced an 
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arms race for more sophisticated weaponry and the militarization of the drug industry.77 
Therefore, birthed out of the corporatization process with the Gulf Cartel, Los Zetas 
caused another evolutionary shift in the drug industry—militarization—creating their 
own leaner, more savage form of doing business.78 
 Los Zetas’ new corporate-military model of operating fashioned a criminal brand 
of extreme violence. For example, the infamous Zeta tactic of decapitation was nearly 
nonexistent previously in Mexico’s drug war.79 Journalist Samuel Logan explains the 
Zeta brand: 
This criminal brand marked a historical benchmark in Mexico as a time when the 
old school of a ‘gentleman’ drug lord, who would avoid bloodshed in the streets 
and only sell drugs away from children, was over, and the beginning of the new 
school young drug lords who favored violence over discretion, had begun.80 
 
Rivals were forced to adopt violence if they wished to compete against Los Zetas. Cartels 
could no longer simply focus on profits from drug smuggling; they had to partake “in the 
kind of butchery associated with the paramilitaries.”81 Interestingly, it was not only other 
cartels that would adjust to the threat of Los Zetas but also the government. Because of 
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this new level of violence, Mexican security services and rival cartels saw Los Zetas as a 
plague in need of eradication.82 
 
Origins 
 Los Zetas emerged in 1997, when the new leader of the Gulf Cartel Osiel 
Cárdenas Guillen, who took over after Juan García Ábrego’s arrest, decided he needed 
superior protection. A cocaine induced paranoia caused him to believe assassins were 
going to kill him.83 This delusion led Cárdenas to recruit highly trained soldiers from 
Mexico’s Grupo Aeromovil de Fuerzas Especiales (GAFE)—an “elite airborne Special 
Forces who are trained for the purposes of locating and apprehending drug cartel 
members.”84 In the beginning, Cárdenas used his private soldiers for defense from his 
enemies. However, after solidifying his place of power, Cárdenas broadened Los Zetas’ 
purview to debt collection, securing supply lines, settling discontent, and executing 
enemies with grotesque savagery.85 The well-trained fighters gained prominence and 
power by “branding a new style of violence,” and militarizing the drug trade.86 
 Cárdenas sought after the strongest recruits, who brought superior military 
training and knowledge to the cartel.  Cárdenas’ first recruit was Arturo ‘Z-1’ Guzmán 
Decena. He was the one indispensible recruit for Cárdenas because he convinced at least 																																																								
82 Grillo, El Narco, 128. 
83 Grayson and Logan, The Executioner’s Men, 5. 
84 Lisa J. Campbell, “Los Zetas: operational assessment,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 
21:1, 55-80 (2010): 56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310903561429. 
85 Grayson, Mexico, 180. 
86 Ed Vulliamy, Amexica: War Along the Borderline, (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2010), 304. 
	 40	
31 additional elite soldiers to fall under his command.87 With a strong foundation, 
Guzmán ordered the original 31 defectors to recruit and train ten other men in their elite 
military tactics.88 Los Zetas’ founding resembles the military more than any traditional 
criminal group. 
 After Guzmán’s death in 2002, Heriberto Lazcano and Miguel Treviño Morales 
took over. The two leaders came from different backgrounds and thus operated in a very 
different manner. Lazcano rose from a position of military obscurity.89 As a former 
GAFE, Lazcano preferred to blend in with the population, and he was a strong military 
strategist who emphasized methodical training and recruiting.90 Lazcano earned a 
reputation for unmatched ferocity and courage in violent altercations.91 Conversely, the 
ex-Nuevo Laredo police officer, Treviño Morales represented a brash, sadistic leader.92 
Moreover, he built “a reputation for extreme brutality—a man who really ‘gets off’ on 
delivering beastly coups de grâce.”93 Even though the two Zetas are considered as 
contrasting figures, they transformed the organization from a private corporate security 
force into a terrifying and formidable cartel. 
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Tactics and Strategies 
 With a willingness to battle anyone, anytime, and anywhere, training became an 
essential component to Los Zetas’ survival. As Los Zetas expanded and grew in power, 
their emphasis on organization and training ensured their superiority over a growing list 
of adversaries.94 Los Zetas’ training breaks down into two parts: military and zeta 
training. 
 The original Zetas deserted from elite Special Forces units, so they came highly 
trained and disciplined. Before their defection, France’s National Police Intervention 
Group instructed some Zetas on the use of special weapons and counterterrorism in 
preparation for the 1986 World Cup held in Mexico City.95 Several other Zetas received 
training from special operation experts from the United States, Israel, and France at the 
controversial School of Americas in Fort Benning, Georgia.96 With distinct specialized 
training, Los Zetas were well versed in elite military tactics, such as rapid deployment, 
counter-surveillance, psychological warfare, and much more.97 The group’s military 
training made them terrifying yet also awe-inspiring.  
If Los Zetas’ original training was not disturbing enough, the group gained more 
military expertise with the recruitment of Kaibiles from Guatemala. As the anti-guerrilla 
unit from the Guatemalan dirty war, Kaibiles were highly trained killers. Massacring tens 
of thousands so-called insurgents compared to the Mexican army’s hundreds, the 																																																								
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brutality of Kaibiles makes Mexican soldiers look like alter boys.98 According to one 
Kaibil, who testified before the Guatemalan Truth Commission, “Kaibil is a mix of the 
experiences of the United States Rangers, Columbian lanceros, Peruvian commandos, 
Chilean commandos. These approaches were combined and formed as a model adapted to 
our situation, the Kaibil course.”99 And, their situation during the civil war was brutality. 
Tapping into primal human instinct through a dehumanizing process, Kaibiles fostered 
maximum aggression. For instance, it was required that they slaughter animals, eat them 
raw or cooked, and drink the blood to prove their mettle.100 This dehumanization process 
led survivors of Kaibil assaults to believe demons attacked them.101 With advanced 
military training and a reputation for extreme violence, the defection of Kaibiles 
constituted a significant plus for Los Zetas in maintaining an elite military force. 
 As an organization constructed from a military background, Los Zetas set up a 
method to disseminate their knowledge to new recruits. Lazcano first established a 
clandestine recruitment channel using his military contacts and developed training camps 
for new recruits to learn basic tactics, weaponry, and communications.102 As the 
consummate military man, Lazcano developed an elite training ground for his narco-
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recruits where Zetas would instruct plebes for on average six months.103 Cadets would be 
in formation at 0600 dressed in military fatigues ready to partake in physical training, 
surveillance and counter surveillance, and combat skills.104 Additionally, Los Zetas had 
the Kaibiles instruct recruits at a camp north of Guatemala City known as “The Hell.”105 
Besides learning the elite tactics from ex-Special Forces, Zeta recruits were instructed in 
the use of a variety of weapons, such as AR-15s, AK-47s, grenade launchers, helicopters, 
and more.106 Lacking traditional military discipline, however, but equipped with 
specialized violent training, compared to the original defectors, Zeta recruits “are 
considered to be of a more brutal mindset.”107 Therefore, Los Zetas established 
themselves as an armed force first then a business rather than the traditional cartel way of 
establishing the business then using force to protect it. Many consider the group’s tactical 
warfare its most valuable asset.108 
Recruitment and corruption were essential. Not just anyone could be a Zeta, but 
not just Zetas were needed for an organization of this magnitude. Los Zetas always 
searched for new recruits, preferably corruptible youth at ease with violence and willing 
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potential killers.109 Seeking out young, impressionable recruits almost guarantees that Los 
Zetas’ violent indoctrination took root. Further, establishing US connections was 
essential, so Los Zetas forged alliances with US gangs. 110 Basically, inequality and 
institutional failures in Mexico led to systemic corruption and allowed Los Zetas to 
recruit many individuals.111 
When it comes to corruption, Los Zetas were among the most efficient. Because 
of the institutional shortcomings yet providing the business infrastructure in the border 
region, Los Zetas became adept in the art of corrupting law-enforcement and political 
officials.112 In 2005, corruption became so pervasive in Los Zetas’ main operating hub, 
Nuevo Laredo, that only 150 out of 700 police officers reported for duty after federal 
officials conducted an audit.113 Roughly 15% of cartel profits went towards the 
corruption of government officials, and those who do not comply “disappeared.”114 Los 
Zetas, therefore, raised the bar on the traditional cartel ideology of plata o plomo, silver 
or lead, with vicious ferocity.115 According to former Zeta operative, Hector Moreno, 
“When the Zetas arrived, they recruited everyone to work for them,” and those who 
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refused were killed.116 Los Zetas’ violent tactics made their recruitment and corruption 
operations extremely successful. 
 Los Zetas made a name for themselves through the usage of violent military 
tactics when dealing with rivals. For example, police used to extort criminals for 
protection, but, with Los Zetas, this was no longer the case.117 The criminal organization 
had no patience for antagonists. Not to say other criminal insurgent groups did not react 
violently to authorities, but Los Zetas’ tactics far surpassed other armed organization in 
relation to their enthusiasm for violence—that is, the use of high-caliber weapons in acts 
of grotesque torture and mass killings with military precision.118 Los Zetas frequently 
plunged enemies into vats of acid, beheaded them, castrated them, and dismembered 
them while still alive as warnings to their rivals.119 The use of these tactics instilled fear 
throughout the organization’s territories and was a part of a larger strategic goal to 
solidify control. 
 Los Zetas infiltrated installations using disguises and coordinate media 
suppression. They ran a covert operation in 2007 impersonating soldiers conducting a 
routine weapons check at two police stations, murdering seven government officials. 
Even more brazen, disguised as SWAT team members in Phoenix, Arizona, a group of 
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Zetas killed a rival trafficker and engaged in a firefight with authorities.120 Unfortunately, 
with each successful operation, Los Zetas only became more embolden and violent, and 
the implementation of these tactics illustrate the group’s overarching military strategy of 
seizing power through psychological operations (PSYOPS). 
 An effective military tool, Los Zetas acquired understanding of PSYOPS during 
the original Zetas’ and Kaibiles’ Special Forces training. The School of Americas 
handbook describes how to properly utilize PSYOPS. For example, it explains proper 
utilization of violence against individuals and their families when extracting 
information.121 PSYOPS became an instrumental tool for the criminal organization to 
seize power and control over narco-territories. One well-publicized operation occurred on 
June 8, 2005. On that day, Los Zetas filled Nuevo Laredo police chief, Alejandro 
Domínguez Coello, with 30 bullets only six hours after he took office because he 
publically refused to compromise his principles.122 The audacity of this murder 
demonstrates that human life held little to no value to the criminal group outside of being 
a Zeta. 
 Los Zetas’ PSYOPS went far beyond generating fear amongst authorities and 
rival narcos. For the vast majority of individuals, the name Los Zetas “has become an evil 
talisman, and to avoid uttering it is a primal act of superstition.”123 Two excellent reasons 
for this sentiment were Los Zetas’ torture and kidnapping trades. First, Los Zetas 																																																								
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preferred creativity in the usage of torture tools. Tools consisted of blowtorches, 
carpenters’ planes, knives, tourniquets, and electricity.124 Sadly, this list is not an 
exhaustive one of the artistic violence Zetas used to torture victims. Second, Los Zetas 
ran an efficient, yet brutal, kidnapping business. In many cases, Los Zetas lured migrants 
into Mexico across the country’s southern border “with false employment and migration 
offerings through the use of website advertisements.”125 Once in Mexico, they would 
kidnap and attempt to extort the migrants. Unfortunately, nothing always goes according 
to plan. As mentioned, in 2010, the world became keenly aware of Los Zetas’ brutal mass 
kidnappings because of the San Fernando massacre, where 72 migrants were found 
executed.126 While other narcos have used torture and kidnapping before Los Zetas, it 
was the organization’s mastery of PSYOPS and military precision that set them apart 
from the rest. The genius behind Los Zetas’ strategy was the group’s use of media to 
publicize their violent power grab—both through traditional and new media outlets. 
Los Zetas cornered the market in narco-publicity, using the exposure to increase 
the effectiveness PSYOPS. Plenty of the grotesque and gruesome acts were exhibited on 
a variety of media outlets. Los Zetas were eager to promote their PSYOPS campaign via 
new and old media conduits. They bathed the public in fear promulgating the Zeta brand 
through YouTube, narco-banners, narco-corridos, messages left on and around corpses, 
etc.127 One YouTube example that Los Zetas posted was of the headless bodies of eight 																																																								
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soldiers they killed in the state of Guerrero.128 Another was a prison break of fifty-three 
inmates in Zacatecas, on May 16, 2009.129 These are two prime examples of Los Zetas 
utilizing new forms of media to their advantage, but one of their more effective ways the 
organization promoted its PSYOPS strategy was through the convergence of old and new 
media outlets.130 
Narcomantas, or public banners, represented the backbone of Los Zetas’ PSYOPS 
efforts. These low-tech messages were extremely effective because of the merging 
between old and new media, and the banners were often guarded by “a decapitated head 
or quartered remains.”131 One recruitment banner read: 
Operative group "Los Zetas” wants you, military or ex-military. We offer good 
salary, food and attention to your family and do not suffer abuse and not suffer 
hunger. We won’t feed you Maruchan soups. If you are not serious, then refrain 
from calling. Interested contact Tel: 867-168-7423.132 
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Los Zetas knew that the military receives poor wages, treatment, and food in Mexico, so 
this banner called for recruitment of well-trained individuals, solider to soldier. When the 
banner references Maruchan soups, the ex-military Zetas were referring to a cheap bland 
noodle soup that soldiers had to eat, and the criminal groups was offering better 
opportunity for any disgruntled troop.133 By offering better wages and treatment to Zeta 
members, the banner illustrates a desire, at least on some level, for the criminal 
organization to keep morale high within its ranks. 
Los Zetas subscribed to the Esprit de Corps philosophy to promote loyalty and 
unity. Typically, this philosophy is used within militaries and is rarely practiced in 
criminal organizations.134 Yet, with a military background, Los Zetas preferred the 
doctrine and implemented it in a variety of ways, such as earnings, amenities, prison 
breaks, body recovery, honoring the dead, and occultism. Narcos often earned three times 
the amount they would in the military.135 Moreover, loyalty is another large aspect of this 
philosophy, so Zetas were willing to risk capture or death to honor or recover their dead. 
For instance, after the death of Guzmán Decena (Z-1) in 2002, flower arrangements were 
placed at his grave with the inscription: “We will always keep you in our hearts: from 
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your family, Los Zetas.”136 Moreover, after Lazcano’s (Z-40) reported dead in October 
2012, a group of armed men went to the funeral home and recovered the body.137  
 Los Zetas were violent and intelligent businessmen. First, to control the mass 
groups of kidnapped migrants, they utilized a method of torture they called tablear, 
which consists of Zetas striking victims in the lower back with a wooden board.138 This 
technique worked twofold in suppressing those kidnapped because it weakened victims 
and it instilled fear of worse things to come for any disobedience. Second, in 2009, Los 
Zetas were discovered stealing oil from Petróleos Mexicanos or Pemex. Authorities 
discovered that Los Zetas used high-tech drills to tap into oil pipelines, and they then 
transported and sold the product throughout northern Mexico and occasionally in 
Texas.139 Clearly, by diversifying their business to include kidnapping, extortion, and 
hydrocarbons, Los Zetas were changing the way cartels operated with a more corporate 
and militarized model. By fostering this new deadly business template, Zeta rivals were 
forced to adapt. 
 The rapid ascension to the top of the Mexican drug trade, along with their extreme 
brutality, contributed to the formation of Los Zetas as a criminal brand. Anthropologist 
Howard Campbell states, “Surrounding this organization is a larger than life myth, a sort 
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of Zeta brand name that some criminals use just to scare their targets.”140 This brand 
name expedites the development of new recruits. Criminals understand that the name 
Zeta represents power and respect through violence.141 
A large factor in Los Zetas becoming a criminal brand was how they operated. 
Both the organization’s military background and control of territories contributed to the 
cartel’s brand. First, Los Zetas developed their own insignias “an encircled ‘Z’ on khaki 
shirts, or a ‘Z’ tattoo on upper biceps.”142 Moreover, in a quite literal sense, some recruits 
were branded with a “Z” after successful completion of training.143 The “Z” insignia 
promoted easy name brand recognition for Los Zetas in the same way formal businesses, 
such as Nike or McDonald’s, use symbols for everyone to identify and understand 
quickly. Once Zeta training was complete, as with any job, the employee was ready for 
placement in his or her location. Therefore, Los Zetas adopted the corporate model of 
formal businesses similar to McDonald’s: “As with McDonald’s, local recruits get 
training and the best brand name in the business.”144 However, unlike the fast food chain, 
Los Zetas, as a business, operated more like a large holding company overseeing various 
subsidiaries rather than an independent franchise model. Lastly, the truly remarkable way 
Los Zetas created its brand was through contraband, which could be identified by the 
cartel’s logo. Los Zetas bootlegged movies and music to sell at flee markets with 
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“PRODUCCIONES ZETA in blue letters in the top left-hand corner.”145 Los Zetas went 
to great links to establish its criminal brand, so the organization did not tolerate anyone 
who attempted to benefit from falsely using the Zeta name. 
Los Zetas, as would any company, frowned upon any perceived copyright 
infringement because it devalued the brand. The group’s criminal brand was a special 
kind of brutality and fear. Zetas were so effective at getting what they wanted because of 
the fear the “Z” conjured in their enemies. However, the success of developing such a 
criminal brand through psychological warfare encouraged copycats, known as McZetas, 
attempting to capitalize and profit from using the violent Zeta name.146 Would-be 
criminals invoked Los Zetas’ brand because they recognized that it could facilitate 
accomplishing tasks without much trouble. True Zetas abhorred McZetas. For example, 
in 2008, a man in Monterrey was discovered viciously tortured and killed with a note 
reading: “This is one of those who carried out extortion by telephone trying to pass for 
‘Z’.”147 In another instant, two McZetas were murdered in Reynosa in 2009 with a note 
warning: “This is what will happen to those who attempt to pass themselves off as 
Zetas.”148 Los Zetas went out of its way to maintain its criminal brand, which it created 
through violence and fear. 
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 Since the organization’s inception, Los Zetas transformed the State of Mexico. 
According to Grayson and Logan, “‘Zetanization’ has influenced Mexico’s landscape in 
various ways: in the tactics of rival cartels, in the reconfiguration of state and municipal 
security forces, and in media self-censorship.”149 And, as an unintended consequence, 
Los Zetas acquired an air of mystique as a cartel because of their willingness for 
grotesque levels of violence, which created public hysteria.150 Because of this mythic 
image, rival narcos and security forces were forced to adjust in order to fight back against 
this evolving threat. Los Zetas even inspired the creation of various spin-off groups as 
well as inspiring the formation of other paramilitary groups such as Los Pelones, Los 
Negros, and Las Fuerzas Especiales de Arturo.151 Furthermore, on March 3, 2010, a 
number of cartels came to an accord over the need to eradicate Los Zetas known as the 
Fusion of Anti-Zeta Cartels (Fusión de Cárteles Antizetas—FCAZ).152 This accord was 
significant because the coalition agreed to match Zetas’ level of violence, sparking the 
militarization of other cartels, and it united the two major cartels in a common goal of 
eradicating Los Zetas: the Sinaloa Cartel and the Gulf Cartel, both representing the 
original corporate model adapting to the new militarized business framework. 
 These new groups and alliances wasted no time developing Los Zetas’ methods. 
For example, the Fusión de Cárteles Antizetas employed Zetas’ media strategy by 
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creating YouTube videos threatening the extermination of its members.153 These anti-
Zetas attempted to fight violence with violence. Moreover, the FCAZ decided to embrace 
other Los Zetas’ instruments for spreading fear: they publicized through social media, 
such as Facebook and Twitter.154 These actions illustrate that even though Los Zetas first 
honed and mastered fear as effective weapon, the organization’s rivals were eager to 
develop their own basic PSYOPS programs.155 Because of the level of brutality, the war 
between Los Zetas and anti-Zetas required a steady supply of soldiers. 
  Since the formation of Los Zetas and the militarization of the drug industry, 
military defection has become all but common in Mexico. Deplorable working conditions 
and low pay led to an estimated 150,000 desertions since 2000.156 Because the demand 
for highly trained soldiers, “deserters include snipers, paratroopers, survival experts, 
intelligence analysts and rapid reaction specialists.”157 Thus, criminal organizations 
underwent an increase of well-trained recruits for the violent regulation of the illicit 
industry. Los Zetas turned Mexico into a war zone because the group’s proclivity for 
brutality led others to follow, resulting in unprecedented levels of violence. 
Even though the Sinaloa Cartel is considered the world’s largest and strongest 
cartel, it was not impervious to Los Zetas’ effects. The leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, 
Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán, always operated the cartel in accordance with the 																																																								
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traditional business model. For example, El Chapo promoted the image of the Godfather, 
who supported community projects and job creation. Unfortunately, he felt compelled to 
employ gratuitous and grotesque violence.158 All cartels have nefarious aspects and are 
willing to commit a certain level of violence, but El Chapo was largely a man said to not 
indulge in unnecessary brutality. Yet, when it comes to Los Zetas, El Chapo tended to be 
merciless. In response to Los Zetas, El Chapo and the Sinaloa Cartel established their 
own paramilitary force called Los Pelones.159 The number one cartel in the world had 
now become even more menacing and violent. 
Another cartel to emulate Los Zetas was the Beltrán Leyva Cartel, an affiliate of 
the Sinaloa Cartel. Recognizing the rising tide of violence Los Zetas created, the Beltrán 
Leyva Cartel felt the need to protect itself. Consequently, the organization created its 
paramilitary force known as Las Fuerzas Especials de Arturo (FEDA, Special Forces of 
Arthur).160 This paramilitary group originally formed to combat Los Zetas, which was 
evident when the cartel sent its Mata Zetas, or Zetas Killers, to purge Cancún.161 More 
importantly, FEDA adopted Los Zetas’ tactic of posting YouTube videos to depict the 
torture and humiliation of Zeta members trying to strike fear within Los Zetas.162 
Ironically, the Beltrán Leyva Cartel would switch allegiances from the Sinaloa Cartel to 
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align with Los Zetas, yet it was a new organization that emerged that replicated Los 
Zetas’ model the most. 
La Familia is an organization based out of Michoacán. It was not a coincidence 
that the new group derived its organizational structure from Los Zetas since Zetas trained 
its original members in guerrilla warfare in 2005 and 2006.163 La Familia also adopted 
Los Zetas’ other skillsets, such as castration, mutilation, PSYOPS, social media, etc.164 
One interesting example of La Familia’s diversification is how the organization mines 
iron ore and sells it to Asia for chemicals to produce synthetic drugs. Learning the 
profitability of harvesting raw minerals from Los Zetas, La Familia conducts 
transnational trades to support other aspects of its business.165 However, the new 
organization decided to break ties with Los Zetas in a violent way in 2006. Taking a page 
out of their predecessor’s PSYOPS handbook, on September 6, 2006, La Familia made its 
first public statement by throwing five human heads onto the dance floor at a nightclub in 
Uruapan, Michoacan.166 In an ironic move, La Familia deployed the furious military 
tactics taught to them against its former teachers. After breaking ties, La Familia 
established its own elaborate indoctrination campaign as part of their PSYOPS method.  
La Familia uses a variety of indoctrination methods. First, and foremost, the 
group considers itself a faith-based organization. The group’s first leader, Nazario 
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Moreno Gonzalez developed a Bible for the cartel with personalized saying.167 By 
establishing this religious component, the group sought to easily “control and intimidate 
La Familia’s membership.”168 However, La Familia’s indoctrination did not stop with 
cartel members. The organization paid for full-page ads in local newspapers and 
published a manifesto pronouncing itself as an anti-crime group.169 La Familia was 
claiming to be Michoacán’s savior against institutional failures and other organized 
criminal groups. With La Familia and other cartels undergoing militarization because of 
Los Zetas, the Mexican government was forced to adapt as well. 
Since the corporatization and militarization of organized crime, marked by the 
rise of Los Zetas, the Mexican government has been trying to adapt and catch up. Many 
citizens consider these criminal groups to be more astute than the Mexican security 
forces.170 This loss of public trust was one reason President Calderón made combating 
Los Zetas his highest priority while in office.171 After Calderón entered office, he 
deployed over 40,000 federal police and troops to battle narco-traffickers.172 Calderón 
was only reaffirming and expanding Mexico’s position on handling the drug trade that his 
predecessor, Vicente Fox, established. First, Project Sparta was developed to train elite 
soldiers, much in the same manner as the original Zetas, in counter-insurgency, urban 
																																																								
167 Ibid., 5. 
168 Ibid., 15. 
169 Longmire, Cartel, 26. 
170 Campbell, “Los Zetas: operational assessment,” 55. 
171 Grayson, Mexico, 192. 
172 Ibid., 119. 
	 58	
warfare, etc.173 Another example of how the government was adapting because of Los 
Zetas was the Mexican military issuing heavy armored vehicles since Los Zetas 
introduced their version known as El Monstruo, or the Monster.174 Unfortunately, 
Calderón’s actions only seem to further militarize the narco-industry. Los Zetas’ ability 
to cause its rivals and the Mexican government to change the way they each operate lends 
credence to the group as a modernizing force. 
 Los Zetas played an evolutionary role in the way cartels and the Mexican 
government engaged one another, resulting in extreme levels of violence. Through the 
group’s corporate beginnings, brutality, and successful utilization of PSYOPS to embed 
fear among the public, Los Zetas ushered in a new model for conducting narco-business. 
The organization paved the way for other groups, and its unique brand of violence might 
be “the ultimate inspiration for postmodern criminal groups worldwide.”175 Los Zetas’ 
willingness to use violence forced rivals and government security forces to adapt, which 
gave birth to a new era of unprecedented levels of violence in Mexico. Competition 
between Los Zetas and its rivals resulted in countless human rights violations. The 
violence also amongst these groups has caused splinter groups to form creating more 
competition and meaningless violence. While Los Zetas’ power has deteriorated over the 
last few years, the group’s corporate-military model remains.  
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Conclusion 
Corporatization and militarization of organized crime created an epidemic of 
violence in Mexico. The Mexican government down plays the violence listing the death 
toll in a 2013 official report as an estimated 47,515 people being killed since 2006.176 
However, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, the death toll is estimated at 
240,000 people since 2000 with another 26,000 still disappeared.177 This drastic increase 
in violence is linked to the corporatization and militarization of cartels. Since the 1990s, 
organized crime in Mexico has become more and more diversified, militarized, and 
violent. Although many consider Los Zetas, as an organization, is in a decline since the 
death or arrest of their original members, the group’s evolutionary influence remains. Old 
groups, such as the Gulf Cartel (i.e., Los Zetas’ former employer), continue to adapt 
while new groups, such as Cartel Jalisco-New Generation, are adopting the Zeta 
corporate-military model.  
The evidence for this model remains present in the high levels of violence in 
Mexico. In 2017, the country witnessed more than 29,000 homicides—the highest death 
toll since the peak of the war against Los Zetas in 2011.178 In fact, though Los Zetas’ 
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power has faded, the level of violence has only increased during President Peña Nieto’s 
sexenio (2012-2018). Conversely, the United States is seeing a significant loss of life 
because of the drug problem, especially because of opioids. The Council on Foreign 
Relations documents, in 2016, that drug overdoses caused more than 59,000 deaths in the 
United States.179 With so much death, Mexico and the United States must stop the 
hyperbolic rhetoric and political grandstanding simply for public consumption and 
instead come together to find nuanced solutions to the violence and the drug industry. 
The NAFTA negotiations present an opportunity for both the United States and 
Mexico to discuss policies to reduce violence, addiction, inequality, and corruption. As 
the historical perspective showed, the impact of NAFTA and other neoliberal reforms 
played a huge role in allowing cartels to undergo corporatization, so the new negotiations 
must consider the consequences for each policy, intended and unintended. Both countries 
do not have the ability to solely focus on the formal economy. Moreover, because the 
illicit industry is transnational, requiring cooperation across borders, the United States 
and Mexico need to consider what is being exported from both countries, not just from 
Mexico. As such, Mexico needs to stop pushing to keep immigration, the drug trade, and 
border security out of the negotiations; whereas, the United States needs to stop using 
insulting language towards Mexico, which only serves to keep officials from the 
negotiation table. By limiting the negotiations to the formal economy, both nations refuse 
to learn from history and the impact of NAFTA on cartels.  
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Using the understanding of how the corporate-military cartel functions and how 
policies can play a dramatic role in strengthening organized crime, here are some 
suggestions that Mexico and the United States should considered while discussing a new 
trade deal. One objective of the deal should be to reduce the level of violence and obtain 
a ceasefire amongst criminal organizations. To move towards this goal, Mexico should 
encourage the United States to take a domestic focus—similar to the US rhetoric calling 
for Mexico to fix its problems. The US focus is twofold. First, the United States must 
make a concerted effort to prevent money and weapons from being exported to Mexico, 
which includes oversight of the gun and financial industries and better border checks for 
vehicles leaving the country. Additionally, another way to reduce organized crime profits 
is to prevent revenue from hydrocarbon trading and punish companies caught purchasing 
stolen minerals. Second, Mexico should also negotiate US domestic investment into 
prevention and rehabilitation as a long-term strategy to reduce the number of drug users. 
Executing these two US strategies will decrease cartels ability to build their arsenals with 
weapons coming from the United States.  
Moreover, since the first round of neoliberal policies caused the corporatization of 
organized crime, the second round of negotiations needs to consider how to monitor 
business infrastructure on both side of the border. Better tracking of companies buying 
facilities and monitoring unused properties will make it more difficult for criminals to 
take advantage of resources. Beyond monitoring infrastructure, both nations must secure 
adequate opportunities and living wages for Mexican workers to help prevent laborers 
from seeking supplementary incomes in the illicit drug economy. More importantly, 
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understanding that informal economies and crime can never fully be eradicated, the two 
nations can reduce organized crime’s power and influence over the long term. This 
reduction will be a long-term strategy of investment to strengthen the Mexican state 
throughout the country. Mexico must stop focusing primarily on the central government 
and invest in building infrastructure, job opportunities, and education throughout the 
nation and reduce inequality, which drives people into the drug trade.  
The final suggestions, however, depict a more radical approach. First, the United 
States and Mexico should consider the legalization of marijuana. A majority of US states 
have legalized some form of marijuana’s use, recreation or medical, and 64% of citizen 
support its legalization, according to a recent Gallop poll. There seems to be a slow 
steady change towards the drug’s legalization, so both countries need to seriously 
consider expediting the process. Marijuana sells remain a large revenue stream for 
organized crime, and legalization would remove those profits and create new 
opportunities in the formal economy. Second, create a relationship with the Mexican 
poppy industry and US pharmaceutical companies. Going after opiates can also take 
away large amounts of revenue from cartels. While poppies are grown worldwide, many 
Mexican criminal groups take advantage of farmers’ need to survive, so they grow 
poppies for drug traffickers to produce heroin. Since crop eradication does not work, 
negotiating the growing of Mexican poppies for sell to US pharmaceutical companies 
with strict oversight could reduce opioid profits going to organized crime. Additionally, 
dealing directly with large US companies will insure higher wages for farmers and bring 
them. 
	 63	
Tackling large societal challenges, such as combatting the drug trade, is a 
herculean task for any country. However, the United States and Mexico have the 
opportunity to reflect on the past to better understand to challenges, and, hopefully, they 
will provide nuanced policies. In order to achieve their goals, both countries must show 
humility and understand how each of them contributed to the proliferation of violence in 
Mexico. The suggestions this paper provides will not be easy, or even desired at times, to 
be achieved; they simply are meant to start a discussion. The execution remains in the 
hands of policymakers.   
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